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A FEMINIST VIEW OF AMERICAN ELDER LAW 
Rebecca Korzec' 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A NY discussion of contemporary American elder law must consider gender 
rtissues. 1 A number of gender concerns are readily discernible, including 
workplace and family issues. Significantly, sex-based disparities are increasing 
within the elderly population.2 In turn, these disparities exacerbate problems of 
fairness and equity in meeting intergenerational family needs and expectations.3 
As with childrearing, in contemporary American society, the major care giving 
responsibility for the growing number of frail elderly falls largely on women rather 
than men.4 With an increasing number of women working outside the family 
home,' the intersection of work and family issues is receiving considerable attention 
both in academic circles6 and in the popular media.7 Recently, for example, twenty-
• Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. 
I. See, e.g., Sarah H. Matthews, Gender Roles and Filial Responsibility, in GENDER ROLES 
THROUGH THE LIFE SPAN: A MULTI-DISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE 245, 245-54 (Michael R. Stevenson 
ed., 1994) [hereinafter GENDER ROLES]' "Research on relationships between elderly parents and their 
adult children conducted in the past twenty-five years seems to support the old adage, 'if you have a 
daughter you have a daughter for life; if you have a son you lose him to a wife. '" Id. at 245. A 
general introduction to the legal issues of the elderly is provided by LAURENCE A. FROLIK & RICHARD 
L. KAPLAN, ELDER LAW IN A NUTSHELL (1995). 
2. See, e.g., Toni C. Antonucci et al., Sex Differences in Age and Racial Influences in 
Productive Activities, in GENDER ROLES, supra note I, at 259,268-71; Diane M. Pearce & Kelley 
Ellsworth, Welfare and Women's Poverty: Reform or Reinforcement?, 16 J. LEGIS. 141, 141-50 
(1990). The gender disparity in wages for older women is greater than for younger women. In 1983, 
women in the 55-59 age range eamed only 57% of the amount earned by men; between 20-24, women 
earned 86.3% of men's earnings. Katharine T. Bartlett, Gender and Law: Theory, Doctrine, 
Commentary 284 (1993) (citing FRANCINE D. BLAU & MARIANNE A. FERBER, THE EcONOMICS OF 
WOMEN,MEN,ANDWORK 177(1986». 
3. See Nancy E. Dowd, Family Values and Valuing Families: A Blueprint for Family Leave, 
30 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 335,342 (1993). See generally Martin H. Malin, Fathers and Parental Leave, 
12 TEx. L. REv. 1047, 1049-64 (1994). 
4. See, e.g., ARLIE HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT: WORKING PARENTS AND THE REVOLUTION 
AT HOME 276 (1989); Judith T. Younger, Light Thoughts and Night Thoughts on the American Family, 
76 MINN. L. REv. 891, 898-99 (1992). 
5. The number of women workers almost doubled between 1960 and 1980. By 1993, women 
comprised 45.6% of the workforce, about 58.4 million women. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T 
OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1994, at 396 (114th ed. 1994). 
6. See generally Lucy FISHER, LINKED LIVES: ADULT MOTHERS AND THEIR DAUGHTERS 
(1986); HELEN ZNANIECKA loPATA & HENRY BREHM, WIDOWS AND DEPENDENT WIVES 1542 (1986); 
Kathryn Abrams, "Gender Discrimination" and the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 V AND. 
L. REv. 1183 (1989). 
7. See generally ELIZABETH PERLE MCKENNA, WHEN WORK DOESN'T WORK ANYMORE: 
WOMEN, WORK, AND IDENTITY (1997); JOAN K. PETERS, WHEN MOTHERS WORK: loVING OUR 
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nine colleges and universities were identified as having workplace policies sensitive 
to employee family care responsibilities.8 Regrettably, such workplaces are the 
exceptions in American society.9 
This article examines these significant elder law issues from a feminist 
perspective,1O particularly the feminist jurisprudence of careY Feminism has much 
to teach traditional American law and jurisprudence,12 including elder law. 
Feminist jurisprudential approaches have provided valuable critiques of traditional 
legal topics, including tort law,13 family law,14 corporate law, IS tax law, 16 
commercial law, 17 labor law,18 and internationallaw.19 This article applies similar 
feminist sensibilities20 and methodologies21 to elder law concerns. 
CHILDREN WITHOUT SACRIFICING OUR SEL YES (1997); Dan Cordtz, Hire Me. Hire My Family, FIN. 
WORLD, Sept. 18, 1990, at 76. 
8. Robin Wilson, A Report Praises 29 Colleges for 'Family Friendly' Policies: But other 
institutions are faulted for failing to help employees with child care and aid for sick relatives, CHRON. 
HIGHER EDUC., Oct. II, 1996, atA13-15. Among the colleges and universities listed were: Cornell, 
Harvard, Johns Hopkins, Stanford, University of California System, and the University of Chicago. 
9. See, e.g., Donna L. Wagner, Eldercare: A Workplace Issue, in GROWING OLD IN AMERICA 
(Beth B. Hess & Elizabeth W. Markson eds., 1992). See also Abrams, supra note 6, at 1243; Nancy 
Dowd, Work and Family: The Gender Paradox and the Limitations of Discrimination Analysis in 
Restructuring the Workplace, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 79, 86 (1989). 
10. See, e.g., Katherine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARv. L. REv. 829, 836-49 
(1990). 
11. See, e.g., Leslie Bender, From Gender Difference to Feminist Solidarity: Using Carol 
Gil/igan and an Ethic of Care in Law, 15 VT. L. REv. 1,19-20 (1990). 
12. See generally DRUCILLA CORNELL, BEYOND ACCOMMODATION: ETHlCAL FEMINISM, 
DECONSTRUCTION AND lHE LAW (1991); SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE (1987); JOAN HOFF, LAW, 
GENDER, AND INJUSTICE (1991); BELL HOOKS, YEARNING: RACE, GENDER, AND CULTURAL POLmcs 
(1990); CAlHERINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OFlHE STATE (1989). 
13. Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3,20 
(1988). 
14. Martha Albertson Fineman, Societal Factors Affecting the Creation of Legal Rules for 
Distribution o/Property at Divorce, in AT THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW: FEMINISM AND LEGAL THEORY 
265-78 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Nancy Sweet Thomadsen eds., 1991). 
15. Kathleen A. Lahey & Sarah W. Salter, Corporate Law in Legal Theory and Legal 
Scholarship: From Classicism to Feminism, 23 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 543,544-57 (1985). 
16. Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income T{DC Movement: A 
Typical Male Reaction, 86 MICH. L. REv. 465, 506-11 (1987). 
17. Karen Gross, Re-Vision of the Bankruptcy System: New Images of Individual Debtors, 88 
MICH. L. REv. 1506, 1532 (1990). 
18. Marion Crain, Images of Power in Labor Law: A Feminist Deconstruction, 33 B.C. L. REv. 
481, 511 (1992); Marion Crain, Feminizing Unions: Challenging the Gendered Structure of Wage 
Labor, 89 MICH. L. REv. 1155, 1184-86 (1991). 
19. Hilary Charlesworth et aI., Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85 AM. 1. INT'L L. 
613,634 (1991); Karen Engle, International Human Rights and Feminism: When Discourses Meet, 
13 MICH. J. INT'L L. 517, 531-35 (1992). 
20. See, e.g., Robin L. West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1,4-5 (1988); Joan 
C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REv. 797, 798 (1989). Deborah Rhode has 
suggested that feminist theories have three things in common: 
On a political level, they seek to promote equality between women and men. On a substantive 
level, feminist critical frameworks make gender the focus of analysis; their aim is to reconstitute 
legal practices that have excluded, devalued, or undermined women's concerns. On a 
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In general, American elder law is traditional in approach. Traditional or classical 
American jurisprudence, like elder law, promotes autonomy, personal 
responsibility, rationality, and individualism.22 On the other hand, feminism, 
especially the feminist "ethic of care" associated with the work of Carol Gilligan,23 
rejects these traditional c'oncepts in favor of solidarity, empathy, and community 
responsibility.24 This article argues that the feminist ethic of care should displace 
the traditional American approach to elder law. 
II. THE FEMINIST ETHIC OF CARE 
Women's "different voice"25 theory views the ethic of care as a superior model 
of legal reasoning and societal organization.26 For example, the feminist ethic of 
methodological level, these frameworks aspire to describe the world in ways that correspond to 
women's el'periences and that identifY the fundamental social transformations necessary for full 
equality between the sexes. 
Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L. REv. 617, 619 (1990). 
21. See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 10, at 836-49; Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual 
Equality, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1279, 1293-1301 (1987); Martha Minow, Feminist Reason: Getting It and 
Losing It, 38 J. LEGAL Eouc. 47,48-49 (1988). 
22. By this I mean that individuals are viewed as primarily responsible for their own needs as 
they age; society and government need only provide a "safety net" against individual calamity. See, 
e.g., Leslie A. Morgan, Economic Security of Older Women: Issues and Trends for the Future, in 
GROWING OLD IN AMERICA, supra note 9, at 275. Linda C. McClain explains that the term 
"autonomy" may have two distinct meanings~me associated with isolation; the other, with self-
governance. 
The prominence of moral development and psychological theory in feminist jurisprudence might 
explain part of the confusion ofthe meanings of autonomy. The mixture of those distinct but 
overlapping meanings has obscured the extent to which feminists and liberals share kindred 
concerns. Autonomy need not be atomistic, and ... autonomy as self-government [may coexist} 
with and include many forms of connection among citizens. 
Linda C. McClain, 'Atomistic Man' Revisited: Liberalism. Connection. and Feminist Jurisprudence, 
65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1171, 1190 (1992). 
23. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S 
DEVELOPMENT 62-63 (1982). 
24. See, e.g., Minow, supra note 21, at 47-48 ("Feminists have shown how ... assertions of 
neutrality hide from view the use of a male norm. . .. Adopting such feminist critiques can deepen 
the meaning of equality under law. I advocate developing similar feminist critiques in contexts beyond 
gender, such as religion, ethnicity, race, handicap, sexual preference, socioeconomic class, and age."). 
25. See. e.g., Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re)Torts: Thoughts on the Liability CriSis. Mass Torts. 
Power, and Responsibilities, 1990 DUKE LJ. 848, 901-02 (1990); Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending 
Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1118, 1129 
n.56 (1986); McClain, supra note 22, at 1188-94; Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatist and the 
Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1699, 1712 (1990). 
26. GILLIGAN, supra note 23, at 166, 174. See also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Mainstreaming 
Feminist Legal Theory, 23 PAC. LJ. 1493, 1497-1522 (1992). But see Richard A. Posner, 
Conservative Feminism, 1989 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 191, 214 (arguing that "Gilligan's ethic of care cannot 
be made the basis for a coherent feminist jurisprudence"). Gilligan's "different voice" theory has its 
critics. See generally CAROL T A VRIS, THE MISMEASURE OF WOMAN 79-90 (1992); John Broughton, 
Women's Rationality and Men's Virtues: A Critique of Gender Dualism in Gilligan's Theory of Moral 
550 UNIVERSITY OF TOLEDO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28 
care values interconnectedness and relationships27 over the traditional "male" 
characteristics of individualism and rights.2s 
Carol Gilligan identified two distinct approaches to moral problem-solving. The 
first resembles the dominant rationality and methodology of traditional American 
jurisprudence. This traditional model is rights-based, emphasizing the use of 
generalized principles and rules to settle disputes between individuals. Under this 
approach, the justice-oriented, "neutral" problem-solver/decision-maker embodies 
a heightened moral development. Historically, this traditional approach 
monopolized American jurisprudence. 29 
Gilligan's second approach comprises an ethic of care, focusing on the unique 
factual context as well as on the parties' interdependencies and interpersonal 
responsibilities and rights.30 This ethic of care rejects adversarial disputes in favor 
of preserving on-going relationships and forging cooperative solutions grounded in 
the specific facts of the problem at hand?1 Significantly, Gilligan argues that 
although both men and women employ care concerns, women employ them more 
often and more consistently because they tend to focus more energy and time on 
personal relationships.32 She concludes that for men ''the moral imperative appears 
rather as an injunction to respect the rights of others and thus to protect from 
interference the rights to life and self-fulfillment."33 
Development, 50 SOC. REs. 597, 603 (1983); Catherine G. Greeno & Eleanor E. Macoby, How 
Different is the Different Voice?, 11 SIGNS 310, 316 (1984). 
27. GILLIGAN, supra note 23, at 160. 
28. Id. at 100. 
29. See generally CATIlARlNE MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 237 
(1989); Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373, 
1380 (1986). Robin West argues that "[t]he values that flow from women's material potential for 
physical connection are not recognized as values by the Rule of Law, and the dangers attendant are 
not recognized as dangers by the Rule of Law." West, supra note 20, at 58. Leslie Bender notes that 
Gilligan identified two distinct methods of moral problem solving. 
One perspective, which [Gilligan] denominated an ethic of justice, closely parallels the dominant 
rationality and methodology of Anglo-American law. The justice ethic is based on a rights 
model, where problem-solving consists of the application of abstract, generalized principles to 
arbitrate rights disputes between separate individuals. 
Bender, supra note 11, at 36-37. 
30. GILLIGAN, supra note 23, at 100-104. 
31. Id. See also Bender, supra note 25, at 905-07; Finley, supra note 25, at 1172. 
32. GILLIGAN, supra note 23, at 62-63. See generally Littleton, supra note 21, at 1293-1301. 
For a compelling critique of Gilligan's ethic of care, see McClain, supra note 22, at 1196-1202. 
33. GILLIGAN, supra note 23, at 62-63. Gilligan's work forms the basis of cultural feminism, 
which Robin West describes as follows: 
Cultural feminism does not simply identify women's differences-patriarchy too insists on 
women's differences-it celebrates them .... Women's ways of knowing, and women's heart, 
are all, for the cultural feminist, redefined as things to celebrate .... Integrative knowledge is 
not a confused and failed attempt to come to grips with the elementary rules of deductive logic; 
it is a way of knowledge and should be recognized as such .... Women's distinctive aesthetic 
sense is as valid as men's. Most vital, however, for cultural feminism is the claim that intimacy 
is not just something women do, it is something human beings ought to do. Intimacy is a source 
of value, not a private hobby. It is morality, not a habit. 
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Clearly, the epistemological argument that women know things differently from 
men is controversial.34 Feminists continue to debate whether women's focus on 
care and relationships is inherently female3s (the essentialist view) or the result of 
life experiences, such as mothering or facing discrimination.36 
Although scholars have focused on Gilligan's theme that women speak in a 
"different voice," a voice possessing "more advanced, more affi1iative ways of 
living,"37 Gilligan's work advances an equally compelling second message. She 
argues that traditional, stereotypical notions of masculinity and femininity warp 
true human potential for leading a balanced, authentic life; the masculine stereotype 
neglects care of others, while the feminine stereotype neglects care of self.38 
Employing either explicit or implicit male-based norms when analyzing elder law 
issues creates disadvantages for women. However, change must be more than 
semantic. Changing mere words without changing their underlying assumptions 
about men and women is largely meaningless. Here, a significant analogy in tort 
analysis may enhance our understanding. At one time, the negligence law's 
standard of care focused on the "reasonable man" or "man of reasonable 
prudence."39 To avoid the overt sexism of this standard, negligence jurisprudence 
West, supra note 20, at 28 (emphasis added). 
34. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Culture Clash in the Quality 0/ Life in the Law: Changes 
in the Economics, Diversification and Organization o/Lawyering, 44 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 621, 643-
44 & n.1 10 (citing MAYF. BELENKYET AL., WOMEN'S WAYS OF KNOWING: THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
SELF, VOICE, AND MIND (1986». See also Posner, supra note 26, at 193-214. 
35. See, e.g., West, supra note 20, at 26-27. See generally NANCY CHODOROW, REPRODUCTION 
OF MOTIlERING: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER 7 (1986) ("[W]omen, as mothers, 
produce daughters with mothering capacities and the desire to mother."). 
36. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 20, at 803, n.17. 
37. GILLIGAN, supra note 23, at 49. 
38. Id. at 168-74. This is evidenced, for example, by the fact that women generally devote not 
only physical energy and attention to the needs of others, but also mental energy and attention. See 
generally Rebecca Korzec, Working on the "Mommy-Track": Motherhood and Women Lawyers, 8 
HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 117 (1997). 
39. See, e.g., Osborne M. Reynolds Jr., The Reasonable Man of Negligence Law: A Health 
Report on the "Odious Creature," 23 OKLA. L. REv. 410, 410, 414 (1970). See also A.P. HERBERT, 
UNCOMMON LAW 1, 5-6 (8th ed. 1969) (for an amusing satire demonstrating the sexism of the 
standard). Herbert's hypothetical judge declares that: 
\ [M]y own researches incline me to agree, that in all that mass of authorities which bears upon 
this branch of the law there is no single mention of a reasonable woman. It was ably insisted 
before us that such an omission, extending over a century and more of judicial pronouncements, 
must be something more than a coincidence; that among the innumerable tributes to the 
reasonable man there might be expected at least some passing reference to a reasonable person 
of the opposite sex; that no such reference is found, for the simple reason that no such being is 
contemplated by law; that legally at least there is no reasonable woman, and that therefore in this 
case the learned judge should have directed the jury that, while there was evidence on which 
they might find that the defendant had not come up to the standard required of a reasonable man, 
her conduct was only what was to be expected of a woman, as such .... 
. . . It is probably no mere chance that in our legal text-books the problems relating to married 
women are usually considered immediately after the pages devoted to idiots and lunatics. 
Indeed, there is respectable authority for saying that at Common Law this was the status of a 
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began employing a "reasonable person" standard.40 However, this apparently 
sweeping semantic alternative itself proved problematic. As Leslie Bender 
explains: 
This "resolution" of the standard's sexism ignores several important feminist insights. 
The original phrase "reasonable man" failed in its claim to represent an abstract, 
universal person. Even if such a creature could be imagined, the "reasonable man" 
standard was postulated by men, who, because they were the only people who wrote 
and argued the law, philosophy, and politics at that time, only theorized about 
themselves. When the standard was written into judicial opinions, treatises, and case 
books, it was written about and by men.41 
Similarly, Guido Calabresi asks whether the term "reasonable person" includes 
women or people of non-WASP (non-White Anglo-Saxon Protestant) beliefs.42 
Significantly, the use of this seemingly universal standard may be intended to cause 
those who would be "different" from the male-based norm to adopt the dominant 
analysis.43 As a result, the reasonable person standard may actually invalidate 
"different voices."44 
This invalidation of the feminist perspective decreases the likelihood that the 
quality of social, political, and legal decision-making will improve. When the 
system of legal analysis embraces many different perspectives-including 
perspectives of gender, race, and ethnicity-the quality of ideas must necessarily 
improve.45 Contemporary elder law must reexamine basic questions, subjecting the 
old orthodoxies to renewed scrutiny and debate. Without revitalization and 
reendorsement, society's value systems might harden into a desiccated orthodoxy, 
which individuals perceive as merely an external imposition of restrictive, 
outmoded rules. 
Feminist jurisprudence can vitalize this process of debate and reconsideration. 
As a paradigm for analysis of elder law questions, the feminist ethic of care can 
illuminate new insights and expose values having true worth that may have been 
hidden from view by the current elder law system. Analysis of areas in which 
gender-based distinctions have affected elder law jurisprudence leads inexorably 
/d. 
woman .... It is no bad thing that the law of the land should here and there conform with the 
known facts of everyday experience. The view that there exists a class of beings, illogical, 
impulsive, careless, irresponsible, extravagant, prejudiced, and vain, free for the most part from 
those worthy and repellent excellences which distinguish the Reasonable Man, and devoted to 
the irrational arts of pleasure and attraction, is one which should be as welcome and as well 
accepted in our Courts as it is in our drawing-roams-and even in Parliament. . .. I find that 
at Common Law a reasonable woman does not exist. 
40. See, e.g., Bender, supra note 13, at 3-S. 
41. Id. at 22. 
42. GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, A TIITUDES, AND 1liE LAW: PRIvATE LAW PERsPECTIVES 
ON A PuBLIC LAW PROBLEM 26-28 (1985). 
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 28. 
45. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 34, at 642-43. 
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to the conclusion that traditional American jurisprudence perpetuates gender 
discrimination.46 This examination from a feminist perspective can only broaden 
analysis and insight, ultimately producing a more responsive elder law 
jurisprudence.47 
III. GENDER ISSUES IN BALANCING W OR!( AND FAMILY 
A. Women as Disadvantaged Workers 
The current legal48 and workplace49 systems are structured largely around male 
norms. Fundamentally, the traditional American workplace is based on the model 
of the average ideal worker: a decidedly male nonn.so This ideal worker essentially 
devotes all his time to career advancement; his wife subsidizes his efforts by 
providing homemaking and childrearing services.51 Moreover, the ideal 
worker-the male worker-toils full-time without interruptions for childbirth, 
childrearing,52 or caretaking of elderly parents.53 Establishing the nonnal male life 
46. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gender and the Constitution, 44 U. CIN. L. REv. I, 4-8 
(1975) (discussing the ways American law hashistorically discriminated against women); John D. 
Johnston, Sex and Property: The Common Law Tradition, The Law School Curriculum, and 
Developments Toward Equality, 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1033, 1044-70 (1972) (discussing how property 
law has historically discriminated against women). 
[d. 
47. Id. at 642-43. Carrie Mendel-Meadow argues that: 
Just as "two heads are better than one," ... two genders ... cannot but help increase the number 
and quality of ideas in circulation for solving legal problems and revising conventional taken-
for-granted categories .... Any disruption of conventional and dominant group thinking must 
improve the quality of legal decision~making. 
48. See, e.g., BARBARA RESKIN & PATRICIA A. Roos, JOB QUEUES, GENDER QUEUES: 
EXPLAINING WOMEN'S INROADS INTO MALE OCCUPATIONS 3-6 (1990); Williams, supra note 20, at 
822. See also supra notes 41-42. 
49. See, e.g., CLAIR BROWN & JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, GENDER IN 1HE WORKPLACE EXECUTIVES 
AND ORGANIZATIONS 3-11 (1987); Felice N. Schwartz, Management Women and the New Facts of 
Lifo, 67 HARV. Bus. REv. 65, 66-68 (1989). 
50. See Williams, supra note 20, at 822. 
51. See HOCHSCHILD, supra note 4, at 6-10 (noting employed women in the labor force still have 
primary responsibility for childrearing and housekeeping). See generally THE WtnTE HOUSE 
WORKING GROUP ON TIlE F AMIL Y, THE F AMIL Y: PRESERVING AMERlCA' S FUTURE (1986). See also 
Williams, supra note 20, at 805. 
52. See, e.g., Proclamation No. 172,45 Fed. Reg. 58,325 (1980) (noting that President Jimmy 
Carter stated: "[w Jorking mothers do not shed homemaking and parental responsibilities; they merely 
add the demands ofajob to those of wife and mother"); Jennifer A. Kingston, Women in the Law Say 
Path is Limited by 'Mommy-Track,' N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1988, atAI (noting that women often reduce 
the number of hours worked to "mommy track:" devoting substantial time to childrearing at the cost 
of career or professional advancement). See also Geneva Overholser, So Where's the Daddy Track?, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1988, at A26. Other women "sequence" by leaving the workplace altogether 
for a period oftime to devote time to family caretaking. See, e.g., Sara Rimer, Sequencers: Putting 
Careers on Hold, N.Y.TIMEs, Sept. 23, 1988, at A21. 
53. See, e.g., Matthews, supra note 1, at 249-50. 
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cycle as the legal and workplace norms creates disadvantages for womenS4 and 
suppresses the expression of women's concerns. 55 Inequities are created for women 
when men are explicitly and implicitly seen as the norm, and women are viewed as 
a deviation from that norm.S6 
The results of these legal and workplace norms become evident-measured in 
traditional terms,S? women lag behind men in professional advancement. 58 The 
current literature on the achievements of women lawyers is instructive. Significant 
numbers of women began entering the legal profession in the 1970s.59 However, 
mere access to the profession has not resulted in equal participation for women:60 
at all levels women lawyers earn less than their male counterparts.61 Moreover, 
women lawyers are less likely to become partners in law firms, judges, or full 
professors in law schools.62 The fact that women lawyers-women knowledgeable 
in the law-have failed to achieve parity in the traditional workplace demonstrates 
that gender discrimination must be systemic in the American workplace.63 
54. In 1990, women earned 71.8% of the median weekly earnings of men. BUREAU OF LABOR 
STA TI5TICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULLETIN No. 2385, WORKING WOMEN: A CHARTBOOK 44 (1991) 
[hereinafter WORKING WOMEN). See also Susan McGee Bailey & Patricia B. Campbell, Gender 
Equality: The Unexamined Basic of School Reform, 4 STAN. L. &PoL'yREv. 73, 75 (1993) (noting 
that although women on average earn only "slightly more than two-third's of a man's salary," their 
wages are an important part of total family income, especially for African-American and Hispanic 
families). As late as 1990, 59"10 of employed women worked in only three occupational areas: clerical, 
service, or sales. WORKING WOMEN, supra at 15. At the same time, the statistics for men were quite 
different; 13.8% in executive, administrative, or managerial jobs, 12% in the professions, and 40% in 
production, craft, operator, fabrication, or laborer occupations. WORKING WOMEN, supra at 42. 
55. See FED. GLASS CEILING COMM'N, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, GOOD FOR BUSINESS: MAKING 
FULL USE OF 1lIE NATION'S HUMAN CAPITAL 34 (1995) (discussing the pressure women feel in trying 
to conform to the norms and rules of the white male corporate climate) [hereinafter FED. GLASS 
CEILINGCOMM'N); Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, Faulty Framework: Consequences of the Difference Model 
for Women in the Law, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 309,317 (1990). 
56. See, e.g., Susan Bordo, The Cartesian Masculinization of Thought, in SEX AND SCIENTIFIC 
INQUIRY 247-64 (Susan Harding & Jean F. O'Barr eds., 1987); Jane Flax, Political Philosophy and the 
Patriarchal Unconscious: Psychoanalytic Perspective on Epistemology and Metaphysics, in 
DISCOVERING REALITY 245, 269 (Sandra Harding & Merrill B. Hintikka eds., 1983). 
57. See, e.g., FED. GLASS CEILING COMM'N, supra note 55, at 34; Deborah L. Rhode, 
Perspectives on Professional Women, 40 STAN. L. REv. 1163, 1178-81 (1988). 
58. See, e.g., A.B.A. COMM'N ON WOMEN IN 1HE PROFESSION, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: 
OVERCOMING 1lIE SISYPHUS FACTOR 5 (1995). 
59. BARBARA A. CURRAN & CLARA N. CARSON, SUPPLEMENT TO 1lIE LAWYER STATISTICAL 
REpORT: THE U. S. LEGAL PROFESSION IN 1988, at 2, 7, 14 (1991). 
60. See generally A.B.A COMM'N WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, supra note 58, at 5-17. 
61. ld. at 12. Among lawyers in practice from one to three years, men eam $37,500, while 
women earn $30,806; men working as corporate general counsel earn $205,000, while women eam 
$152,000. ld. at II. 
62. ld. at 6-17. See also Janet Taber et al., Project, Gender, Legal Education, and the Legal 
Profession: An Empirical Study of Stanford Law Students and Graduates, 40 STAN. L. REv. 1209, 
1224 (1988); Robert J. Borthwick & Jordan R. Schau, Gatekeepers afthe Profession: An Empirical 
Profile of the Nation's Law Professors, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 191, 199-212 (1991). 
63. See generally Cynthia Fuchs Epstein et aI., Glass Ceilings and Open Doors: Women's 
Advancement in the Legal Profession, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 291 (1995). See also Ruth Blumrosen, 
Wage Discrimination, Job Segregation. and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of /964, 12 U. MICH. J .. 
L. REFORM 397, 415-20, 455-57 (1979) (addressing the effects of sexual job segregation and sexual 
stereotyping on the wage gap between men and women); Paul Weiler, The Wages of Sex: The Uses 
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Women's economic disadvantages translate to lesser lifetime earnings64 and 
smaller pensions.6s These economic facts help explain the growing poverty suffered 
by elderly women, including the frail elderly.66 Ultimately, women's work 
interruptions for childbirth, childrearing, and family responsibilities result from the 
gendered nature offamily roles in American family life.67 Clearly, these gendered 
family roles impoverish women financially. More fundamentally, they may 
psychologically and socially impoverish both men and women by discouraging the 
creation of balanced personal and professionallives.68 
B. Gender Roles in the Care of Elderly Parents 
In contemporary American society, members of nuclear families are encouraged 
to be "not only economically independent of one another with the passage of time, 
but emotionally independent as well.'>69 Research conducted over the past twenty-
five years studying the relationships of elderly parents and their adult children 
indicate that the traditional assignment of gender roles occurs in carrying out filial 
and Limits o/Comparable Worth, 99 HARv. L. REv. 1728, 1779-84 (1986) (arguing that even the 
smallest estimate of the gender wage gap "implies a substantial injustice"). For discussions of the 
. legislative history ofTitle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbidding sex-based discrimination in 
employment, see Caroline Bird, Ladies Day in the House, in BORN FEMALE 1-15 (1969); LEO 
KANowrrz, WOMEN AND TIlE LAW: THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 104-05 (1969); Developments in 
the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII o/the Civil Rights Act 0/1964,84 HARv. L. REv. 
1109,1167 (1971). 
64. Bonnie Thornton Dill et aI., Race and Gender in Occupational Segregation, in PAY EQUITY 
AN ISSUE Of RACE, ETHNICITY & SEX II, 63 (1987) (stating that over lifetime, women earn 58% of 
men's income). 
65. Judy Mann, Pensions Short-Change Women, WASH. POST., Aug. 16, 1995, at E17. See 
Women's Pension Equity Act of 1996, S. 1756, l04th Congo (1996). Two of the provisions requiring 
the creation of model language for a qualified joint and survivor annuity and for a quality domestic 
relations order were incorporated in the Small Business Jobs Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
188, 110 Stat. 1755 (1996). Less than one-third of female private retirees have private pensions. U.S. 
DEP'T Of LABOR, RETIREMENT BENEfiTS OF AMERICAN WORKERS 51 (1995). See also OLDER 
WOMEN'S LEAGUE, THE PATH TO POVERTY: AN ANALYSIS OF WOMEN'S RETIREMENT INCOME, 1995 
MOTHER'S DAY REPoRT, I, 3 (1995) (indicating that the average social security benefit for a woman 
based on her own earnings is $538 a month). 
66. See BUREAU OF TIlE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, Poverty in the United States: 1992, 
in CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, at tbl. 5 (1992) (noting that women comprise just under 60% of 
senior citizens over 65, but 75% of the poor elderly). 
67. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Myths o/Meritocracy, 65 FORDHAML. REV. 585, 591 (1996) 
("Women's career sacrifices are attributable not just to women's choices but to men's choices as well. 
Male spouses' failure to shoulder equal family responsibilities and male colleagues' failure to support 
alternative working arrangements are also responsible."); Kerry Hannon, A Woman's Special Dilemma, 
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REp., June 13, 1994, at 93 (stating that a woman with a 40-year career who 
interrupts it for seven years will receive half the pension she would have received from continuous 
employment). 
68. For example, the lawyer who works 2,000 billable hours or more does not have time to be 
a spouse, parent, or friend and may demonstrate distress. See, e.g., Connie J.A. Beck et aI., Lawyer 
Distress: Alcohol Related Problems and Other Psychological Concerns Among a Sample 0/ Practicing 
Lawyers, 10 J.L. & HEALTH I, 3 (1995-96). 
69. Matthews, supra note 1, at 245-46. 
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responsibility.70 As a result, adult sons focus on traditional masculine activities, 
. such as earning money, "at the expense of emotional ties, including those to their 
parents. ,,71 
Generally, one adult child becomes the "primary caregiver" of the elderly 
parent-the child who actually furnishes the daily support and services needed to 
maintain the parent in the commimity.72 These support activities include the major 
and minor tasks associated with daily living, including emotional nurturing and 
caretaking activities such as feeding, bathing, dressing, and nursing.73 The literature 
clearly indicates that, in the absence of a spouse, the primary caregiver for the 
elderly parent is a daughter, daughter-in-law, or niece.74 As a result, when 
contemporary writers bemoan the pressures on the "sandwich generation"7S -adults 
pressured by simultaneous responsibilities to their own children and to their 
parents-they are identifying a gender issue. In reality, it is women who must 
balance work and family, meeting the competing demands of responsibilities to 
their careers, husbands, children, and parents. 
The Family and Medical Leave Act of 199376 fails adequately to address the 
many problems facing the "sandwich generation" of middle-aged women 
responsible for caretaking their own children as well as their elderly parents.77 
Specifically, the Act permits unpaid worker leave to care for a seriously ill son, 
daughter, or parent,1s To date, the practical effect of the Act has been felt more in 
70. /d. The tenn "filial responsibility" refers to an adult child taking some responsibility for the 
financial and emotional care of aging parents. Id. The tenn "role" is "a set of prescriptions and 
proscriptions for behavior-expectations about what behaviors are appropriate for a person holding 
a particular position within a particular social context. A gender role, then, is a set of expectations 
about what behaviors are appropriate for people of one gender." Id. at 246 (citing SJ. KELLSER & W. 
McKENNA, GENDER: AN ETHNOMETHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 18 (1978)). 
71. Id. at 245. 
72. Id. at 249. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. at 250. 
75. The apparently gender-neutral term "sandwich generation" may be inaccurate. See Dorothy 
Miller, The "Sandwich" Generation: Adult Children of the Aging, SOCIAL WORK 419-23. The 
preferred tenn may be "women in the middle"-an alternative term used in sociological literature. 
Matthews, supra note I, at 250. 
76. See Family and Medical Leave (FMLA) Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601, 2612 (1995) (providing 
worker leave following a birth of a child, or to care for a seriously ill child or parent). For a discussion 
of the complexities of the FMLA, see Shelly B. Kroll, An Employee's Perspective on the Family and 
Medical Leave Act, 38 B. B.J., Sept./Oct. 1994, at 4; Jay M. Rector, Family and Medical Leave Act 
of 1993,64 J. KAN. B.A., May 1995, at 22, 39. 
77. See, e.g., Donna R. Lenhoff & Sylvia M. Becker, Family and Medical Leave Legislation in 
the States: Towards a Comprehensive Approach, 26 HARV. I. ON LEGIS. 403, 417 (1989). See 
generally Nancy R. Daspit, The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993: A Great Idea But a "Rube 
Goldberg" Solution?, 43 EMORY L.J. 1351, 1352 (1994); Elizabeth A. Hall, Balancing Work and 
Family: A Legal Perspective, 32 Hous. LAW., Nov.lDec. 1994, at 18. 
78. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(C) (1995). The fact that this leave is unpaid means that fewer than one 
third of employees can afford to take such leave. Iudy Mann, Taking Family Leave to the Next Step, 
WASH. POST, May 30,1997, at E03. See also Donna Lewhoff & Claudia Withers,lmplementation of 
the Family and Medical Leave Act: Toward the Family-Friendly Workplace, 3 J. GENDER & LAW 39, 
53 (1994). 
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the area of maternity leave than in the caregiving of elderly parents.79 Since the Act 
provides only twelve weeks of leave, it cannot meet the long-term needs of elderly 
parents and their adult children. 
International perspectives on family leave may offer helpful counterpoints to the 
American perspective. so Admittedly, foreign legislation also has focused on 
maternity leave issues, including the desire to involve fathers in the caretaking of 
their infants. For example, "Sweden introduced parental leave to make it possible 
for more parents to combine family and working lives, with the aim not only of 
enabling more women to take on dual roles but also as a deliberate attempt to 
strengthen the family, and the man's role in it."sl 
The situation in contemporary Japan is particularly instructive. Japan has the 
highest proportion of households with three generations living together.s2 In fact, 
seven often elderly Japanese live with their adult children.83 The method by which 
the Japanese legal system encourages both public and private responsibilities for the 
elderly provides useful insights. Article 877 of the Japanese Civil Code provides 
that the care and support of an elderly person is the responsibility of that person's 
relatives.84 Significantly, the Japanese government has recognized the problems of 
aging as a gender issue.s5 Japanese proposals include creating a new pension 
system for women that would recognize a mother's absence from the workforce to 
rear children.86 
These issues become critical in light of simple demographic reality. During the 
past fifty years, we have seen dramatic changes in the demographics of the 
elderly.87 Worldwide, in 1990 the percentage of the total population composed of 
persons sixty-five years old or older increased from 5.1 % in 1950 to 6.2%.88 
79. See, e.g., Martin H. Malin, Fathers and Parental Leave, 72 TEX. L. REv. 1047 (1994). 
80. See generally Mikel A. Glavinovich, International Suggestionsfor Improving Parental Leove 
Legislation in the United States, 13 ARIz. 1. INT'L & COMPo L. 147, 168-69 (1996); Carol Daugherty 
Rasnic, Balancing Respective Rights in the Employment Contract: Contrasting the US. "Employment-
At-Will" Rule with the Worker Statutory Protections Against Dismissal in European Community 
Countries, 4 1. INT'L L. & PRAc. 441, 455 (1995); Carol Daugherty Rasnic, The United States' 1993 
Family and Medical Leave Act: How Does It Compare with Work Leave Laws in European 
Countries?, 10 CONN. J. INT'L. L. 105, 133 (1994); Carol Daugherty Rasnic, Who Holds the 
Employment Contract ·:'Trump Card"? Comparing Labor Laws in Germany and the United States for 
the International Investor, 4 IND. INT'L & COMPo L. REv. 33, 54-55 (1993). 
81. See Glavinovich, supra note 80, at 172 (quoting Doreen Taylor-Wilkie, The Men Who Opt 
for Home, THE HERALD (Glasgow), Oct. 11, 1994, at 25). 
82. Toshio Shinmura, Japan: Plan to Live Beyond Age 80, EPA Urges-Social Norms Will 
Change, White Paper Warns, JAPAN ECON. J., Nov. 21, 1994, at B2. 
83. Suzanne Daniel, Growing Old in Japan: Lifestyle-50 Plus, SIDNEY MORNING HERALD, May 
25, 1994, at C3. 
84. Daisaku Maeda, Decline of Family Care and the Development of Public Services-a 
SOCiological analysis of the Japanese Experience, in AN AGING WORLD: Dn.EMMAS AND CHALLENGES 
FOR LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 297, 298 (John M. Eekelaar & David Pearl eds., 1989). 
85. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Women Move into Research Field: Social Issues Neglected by Men 
Come to the Fore, JAPAN ECON. J., July 13, 1992, at B5. 
86. /d. See also Yoshinori Kamo, A Note in Elderly Living Arrangements in Japan and the 
United States, in GROWING OLD IN AMERICA, supra note 9, at 377. 
87. LINDA G. MARTIN & SAMUEL H. PRESTON, DEMOGRAPHY OF AGING 2 (Linda G. Martin & 
Samuel H. Preston eds., 1994). 
88. RICHARDA. POSNER, AGING AND OLD AGE 35 (1995). 
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Moreover, this figure is expected to increase to 8.7% by 2020.89 These figures are 
even higher for the United States population: 8.1% in 1950, 12.6% in 1990, and 
17.5% in 2020.90 Even more striking is the percentage of the population that is age 
eighty or older. In the United States, the percentages of population eighty years old 
or older are as follows: 1.1% in 1950; 2.8% in 1990; and an expected 3.9% in 
2020.91 These increases in the elderly population can be traced to rising real 
incomes, improved health care,92 and a decline in the birth rate. 
C. Economic Issues of Aging 
Traditionally, scholars have examined the economic issues of aging as rational, 
conscious decisions concerning consumption.93 Richard A. Posner argues: 
[T]hat economics can do a better job of explaining the behavior and attitudes 
associated with aging, and of solving the policy problems that aging presents, than 
biology, psychology, sociology, philosophy, or any other single field of natural or 
social science.94 
Economic theory can be applied to aging and elder law issues. Essentially, this 
involves employing economic theory to examine non-market behavior.9s An 
economic theory readily applicable to elder law issues is "human capital," a term 
economists employ to describe the income-generating skills individuals acquire to 
generate financial returns.96 The formation of human capital develops in discrete 
phases: (1) the acquisition phase; (2) the paying returns phase; and (3) the capital 
depreciation phase.97 Investing in education is an example of human capital. For 
example, a student is willing to incur direct costs, such as tuition and books, and 
indirect costs, such as lost income during school attendance, to acquire skills that 
will yield greater income across a lifetime of earnings.98 In general, women have 




92. In 1979, there were an estimated 130,000 open-heart coronary bypass surgeries; in 1992, the 
number rose to 480,000. In 1968, there were 23 heart transplant surgeries in the United States; in 
1993, there were about 2,300. AM. HEART ASS'N, HEART AND STROKE FACTS, 1995 STATISTICAL 
SUPPLEMENT 21 (1995). 
93. See, e.g., Michael D. Hurd, Research on the Elderly: Economic Status, Retirement, and 
Consumption and Saving, 28 J. EcON. LITERATURE 565, 569 (1990). See generally STUDIES IN THE 
ECONOMICS OF AGING (David A. Wise ed., 1994). 
94. See POSNER, supra note 88, at 2. For an example ofthe application of economic theory to 
the family, see Gary Becker, The Economic Way of Looking at BehaVior, 101 J. POL. ECON. 385,395-
401 (1993). 
95. For other examples of applying economic theory to non-market behavior, see generally 
RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON (1992); Becker, supra note 94. 
96. POSNER, supra note 88, at 61·65. 
97. Id.at51-53. 
98. ld. at 51-52. 
99. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 49, at 65. 
100. See, e.g., LENOREJ. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION 337-56 (1985). 
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Closely related to the human capital issue is the problem of "multiple selves."lol 
Simply put, philosophers and economists recognize that individuals may be unable 
to make consistent decisions over a long period of time. lo2 Typically, individuals 
favor the present over the future in making decisions. Moreover, in considering 
issues of personal choice and identity, individuals question whether one remains the 
"same" person over a lifetime, or whether the individual is somehow different over 
time-in actuality not "one self," but rather "multiple selves."lo3 
The role of gender in the related 'issues of human capital and multiple selves 
deserves special consideration. For example, a woman's "choice"l04 to balance 
work and family issues by focusing her attention on childrearing to the detriment 
of career advancement may come from an inability to bring the future clearly into 
current decisionmaking. los Correction of inconsistent preferences over time is not 
a simple matter of providing individuals with accurate information; they will simply 
ignore and distort that information. For example, many women today choose to 
"mommy track,"I06 or "sequence,"107 in order to fulfill their responsibilities as 
wives, mothers, and daughters. The immediate and long-term consequences of 
these choices contribute to the "feminization" of poverty. 108 Basically, the long-
term economic effects of placing family responsibilities firstlO9 lead to the 
impoverishment of single, 110 divorced, III and elderly women. I 12 
The current pension system both reflects and exacerbates the gender income 
gap.113 At retirement, women receive less than one-third of the employer-provided 
101. See POSNER, supra note 88, at 84-85. 
102. See generally Robert Strotz, Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization, 23 
REv. ECON. STUD. 165 (1955-56) (explaining that individuals may have a systematic problem in 
making lifetime consistent decisions). 
103. See POSNER, supra note 88, at 84-85. 
104. The "choice" to focus primary attention on familial caretaking responsibilities may not be 
so much a choice as an accommodation to social and economic pressures. Making a choice to 
subordinate her future economic needs may be analyzed according to Antonio Gramsci's concept of 
cultural hegemony: the dominant culture shapes a "hegemony" of norms and values which limits 
discourse and, ultimately, choice. See ANTONIO GRAMSCI, SELEcnONS FROM TIlE PRISON NOTEBOOKS 
37-54 (Q. Hoare & G. Smith eds. & trans., 1971). 
105. See Thomas S. Ulen, Rational Choice and the Economic Analysis of Law, 19 L. & Soc. INQ. 
487 (1994). 
106. See generally Schwartz, supra note 49, at 70-72. 
107. See generally Sheila Nielsen, The Balancing Act: Practical Suggestions for Part-Time 
Attorneys, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 369, 380-83 (1990). 
108. See WEITZMAN, supra note 100, at 337-40. 
109. Heidi Hartmann, Achieving Economic Equity for Women. in WINNING AMERICA: IDEAS AND 
LEADERSHIP FOR TIlE 1990s, at 99 (M. Raskin & C. Hartman eds., 1988) (suggesting that the 
traditional workplace must be completely transformed such as implementing a six-hour work day for 
all workers). See also Martha L. Fineman, Implementing Equality: Ideology, Contradiction and Social 
Change: A Study of Rhetoric and Results in the Regulation of the Consequences of Divorce, 1983 
WIS. L. REv. 789, 791 (suggesting that reform of the economics of divorce must have the primary 
focus of equality). 
110. See, e.g., Gary Burtless, Comments on Income/or the Single Parent: Child Support, Work. 
and Welfare, in GENDER IN THE WORKPLACE 263 (Clair Brown & Joseph Pechman eds., 1987). 
Ill. See WEITZMAN, supra note 100, at 337-56. 
112. See supra notes 65-66. 
113. See supra notes 65-67. 
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retirement benefits received by men. 114 Since pensions generally are based on a 
formula combining the number of years worked and the actual earned salary, the 
gender gap actually widens during retirement. lls Senator Carol Moseley-Braun 
notes that "a woman with a forty-year career who takes seven years out of the 
workplace may get half of the pension benefits she might have enjoyed with 
continuous employment."116 
Moreover, women who perform the traditional role of wife, without ever entering 
the paid workplace, risk impoverishment from divorce or widowhood. Almost 
eighty percent of women who are poor as widows were not poor before their 
husbands' deaths.1I7 Ultimately, the hardships created by this widening gender 
income gap results in "an increased demand for transfer payments and public 
sUpport."1I8 To avoid these societal costs, both the workplace and the family must 
be transformed. 
IV. TRANSFORMING ELDER LAW THROUGH THE ETHIC OF CARE 
DiSplacing contemporary elder law principles of autonomy and independence 
with the feminist ethic of relational care can help alleviate these gender-based 
inequities. As previously discussed, Carol Gilligan's landmark book, In a Different 
Voice, embodies two complementary themes. Popular literature has embraced 
"different voice" theory, 119 while basically ignoring the equally significant second 
theme. Gilligan argues that traditional gender stereotypes limit human potential for 
leading a balanced life.120 Ultimately the feminist ethic of care rejects the distortion 
and impoverishment of both men's and women's lives, produced by these 
traditional gender roles. It seeks to replace these stereotypes with gender-neutral 
paradigms which require transformation of both home and workplace. 121 More 
specifically, the family and the workplace must be transformed to permit both men 
and women to participate fully in both arenas without risking the loss of income, 
status, or security. 122 
This jurisprudence establishes gender-neutral relational care as the cornerstone 
of family life. The advantage of such gender-neutral policies is to move beyond 
mere formal equality in an attempt to achieve substantive equality between men and 
women. 123 Restructuring workplace expectations must be accomplished in ways 
114. Carol Moseley-Braun, Women's Retirement Security, 4 ELDER L.1. 493, 494-95 (1996) 





119. See supra discussion at part II. 
120. GILLIGAN, supra note 23, at 62-63. See also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different 
Voice: Speculations on a Women's Lawyering Process, I BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39, 55-60 (1985). 
121. See, e.g., Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, in FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE 531 
(Patricia Smith ed., 1993). 
122. [d. at 542-51. 
123. See, e.g., Wendy W. Williams, Notesfrom a First Generation, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 99, 
108-110. 
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that do not perpetuate work/family conflicts as merely a woman's problem. 124 
Essentially, such workplace restructuring must "reshape male-centered attitudes" 
so that changes intended to help women do not ultimately devalue them. 125 
For example, attending to the responsibilities of childrearing and care of elderly 
parents should not exact drastic career costs. These family responsibilities should 
not be viewed as "interruptions" to career advancement which can never be 
overcome. 126 
Moreover, workers who balance work and family may bring to the workplace 
significant qualities, developed in family care of a child or elderly parent, which 
make them more productive workers. These qualities, often identified as 
"feminine" attributes, include empathy, flexibility and patience.127 Relational 
caring has been demonstrated to add to a personal sense of well-being and to 
conscious control over life responsibilities. 128 If true "family values" are to be 
promoted by American jurisprudence, men and women must be equal participants 
in both the home and the workforce. The feminist ethic of care provides a 
framework for achieving this necessary goal. 
124. Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family: The Gender Paradox and the Limitations of 
Discrimination AnalysiS in Restructuring the Workplace, 24 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 79 (1989). 
125. Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 
VAND. L. REv. 1183, 1220-48 (1989). 
126. See, e.g., Mary 10 White, Glass Ceilings and Open Doors: A Response, 65 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 619,620 (1996). 
127. Tammy Audeh, Graduation: Words from the Famous to Those Who May Be. N.Y.TIMEs, 
May 29, 1995 at 9. Gloria Steinman, addressing Smith College graduates, said: 
Id. 
[U]ntil men raise children as much as women do-and are raised to raise children, whether or 
not they become fathers-tbey will have a far harder time developing in themselves these human 
qualities that are wrongly called "feminine," but are really these necessary to raise children: 
empathy, flexibility, patience, compassion, and the ability to let go. 
128. BEITY FRIEDAN, THE FOUNTAIN OF AGE 536 (1993) (discussing the work of Alexis 1. 
Walther and Clara C. Pratt). 
